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THE ENERGY OF BRAZIL:
TUDO ACABA EM SAMBA
Carlos Rufin'
IT is fair to claim that, among all the BRICS (South Africa included),
Brazil is the energy giant. The relative scarcity of energy resources in
China, India, and South Africa is uncontroversial. But what about
Russia? It is one of the world's major oil and gas producers; it has abun-
dant hydroelectric resources (and potential), and plentiful coal as well. I
will argue, however, that Brazil represents the future of the world's en-
ergy supply to a much greater extent than Russia. Brazil has a diverse
and largely renewable energy base; has pioneered the development of
biofuels; and is now at the technological frontier of oil production. Con-
trast these elements with the situation in Russia, where most of the oil
and gas is pumped from areas like the Caspian that have been under ex-
ploitation for more than a century.
To understand Brazil's energy industry, it is necessary to analyze the
three great transformations that have shaped the development of the in-
dustry in Brazil. The shift towards the use of modern energy supply in
Brazil began with the effort to harness the country's huge waterways as
sources of electricity; an effort that continues to this day, although with
increasing acrimony and difficulty. The second great transformation was
Brazil's success in working its vast landmass to turn it into the world's
most advanced biofuel supply complex. The third and final transforma-
tion has stemmed from the development of world-class capabilities to dig
at unprecedented depths below the sea and the discovery of major oil
deposits off Brazil's shores. I will discuss each transformation in turn.
I. BRAZIL, THAT DAM COUNTRY
Brazil is one of the world's largest holders of freshwater. But unlike
Canada, its waters are not closeted by a relative lack of major rivers, or
by a long frozen season. Brazil's waters flow along three major basins-
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the Amazon, Parand, and S~o Francisco basins-that feed large rivers
and tributaries. These enormous masses of water often flow slowly but
with massive mechanical energy that stands ready to be turned into
electricity.
In fact, the electrification of Brazil began towards the end of the 19th
century with the realization that the country's geography and rivers con-
tained excellent potential to bring electricity to the emerging metropo-
lises of Sio Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Drawing on previous experiences
elsewhere, Canadian investors brought American engineer Pearson to re-
verse or alter the flow of several rivers near the Atlantic coast and send
their waters down the steep escarpment that separates much of Brazil's
coast from the interior plateau, the planalto. With these hydroelectric
plants in place, the Brazilian Light & Traction Co.-still known simply as
"Light"-provided Rio and SAo Paulo with sources of electricity that re-
main in operation to this day.
Nevertheless, by contemporary standards, the dams built by Light were
small affairs. Large-scale dam construction began after the Second World
War with the establishment of plans for Brazil's industrialization based on
hydroelectric energy. The first public sector electricity company, Com-
panhia Hidro-Eldtrica do SAo Francisco (CHESF), was established in
1945 to build and manage the Paulo Afonso Dam in the SAo Francisco
river. The dam was constructed in order to foster the development of the
Northeast, the poorest part of Brazil, along the lines of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. In 1952 the National Development Bank (now
BNDES, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econdmico e Social) was
created with the responsibility, among other things, of managing a Fed-
eral Electrification Fund that would channel resources to public sector
utilities. In the same year, the State of Minas Gerais established the Cen-
trais Eldtricas de Minas Gerais (CEMIG) to spur industrial development
around the state capital of Belo Horizonte. The 1954 National Electrifi-
cation Plan identified hydro-generation as a key resource and called for
the formation of a federal holding company, Eletrobris, to coordinate the
electricity sector. With these new instruments in place, the construction
of large dams by the public sector began in earnest with the Furnas Hy-
droelectric Project in 1957, which would ultimately reach a capacity of
more than 1,200 MW. The dam was built by CEMIG and the federal
government, which created a special-purpose company also called Furnas
(Tendler, 1968). In 1961, Eletrobris was finally incorporated and became
the parent company of CHESF and Furnas.
The culmination of large-scale public sector hydroelectric projects was
reached with the Itaipt Dam. Itaipti, commenced in 1973, was jointly
developed by Paraguay and Brazil on a 50-50 basis to attain, at 12,600
MW, the largest capacity of any dam in the world. Itaipii remained the
largest capacity dam up until the opening of China's Three Gorges com-
plex in 2006. But Itaipti was not the last project of its kind. After a long
hiatus caused by Brazil's economic troubles during the 1980s and reform
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of the electricity industry in the 1990s, the government has, in the last five
years, once again taken a leading role with the development of the Rio
Madeira Complex and the Belo Monte Dam, both in the Amazon basin.
Just as important as the construction of large dams was the develop-
ment of a national electricity grid by Eletrobrds and its subsidiaries. As
available sites for the construction of new large-scale hydroelectric facili-
ties became increasingly distant from the major urban areas they had to
be linked by massive transmission lines to the consumption centers. The
next step was to interconnect the various basins of the country to allow
for more efficient management of available generation resources relative
to electricity demand throughout the country. Interconnection between
the basins was finally achieved in 1998, when the North-South Intercon-
nection joined the northern and south-central grids through a 1,300-km
line between the substations of Imperatriz, in Maranhio State, and
Samambaia, in the Federal District of Brasilia (Eletrobrds, 2012) (see Fig-
ure 1).
Because of the continental size of Brazil and the cascading structure of
many of the dams (i.e., many dams are situated linearly along a certain
river basin so that upstream dam operations affect all the downstream
dams), operation of the country's interconnected grid is a very complex
undertaking and must be counted as another major achievement in the
harnessing of Brazil's waters.
II. A SWEET LAND
The sugarcane industry has a long history in Brazil-nearly as long as
the country itself. Although the first commodity boom in Brazil's history
came with the tree that gave its name to the country, Brazilwood, the
systematic colonization of Brazil began with the establishment of sugar-
cane plantations in the Northeast region of the country, from Bahia to
Rio Grande do Norte. It was in Brazil that the Portuguese perfected
what we now call the sugarcane "business model": the use of African
slave labor to grow and process sugarcane to meet Europe's insatiable
demand for the commodity, which dominated Atlantic trade for the next
three centuries. The Northeast's sugar industry went into a secular de-
cline in the 17th century after its Dutch occupiers moved to the Carib-
bean and outcompeted the Portuguese at their own game. The legacy of
this first sugar boom in Brazil is a bitter one: a vast, impoverished former
slave population and a feudalistic social structure that is still very much a
part of Northeastern Brazil.
After many other commodity booms, the real renaissance of Brazil's
sugar industry came in the 1970s with the first oil shock of 1973. The
Brazilian government's response to this shock, which profoundly affected
Brazil's then oil-dependent economy, would be the origin of the world's
most successful biofuels complex. To reduce dependence on imported oil
and cultivate support from the sugar growers along the way, the Brazilian
government launched the ProAlcool program in 1975. The program man-
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Figure 1. Brazil's Electricity Transmission Grid, 2011
Source: Eletrobris, 2011
dated the blending of ethanol distilled from sugarcane juice with gasoline
for motor vehicles and encouraged conversion of vehicles from gasoline
to ethanol.
Although the program successfully encouraged the expansion of the
ethanol-based automobile fleet in the country, it ran into severe problems
during the 1980s when oil prices plunged, international sugar prices rose,
and the country's economic difficulties made it increasingly hard for the
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government to provide subsidies to stabilize ethanol prices. The program
was only saved by a major technological breakthrough in the late 1990s:
the development of flex-fuel engines capable of operating on any blend of
gasoline and ethanol. By allowing car buyers to arbitrage between the
price of gasoline and the price of sugar (via ethanol), flex-fuel technology
eliminated the dilemma of having to choose one type of fuel on a perma-
nent basis, and with oil prices rising once more, this made ethanol a very
attractive fuel for Brazilian drivers. Flex-fuel vehicles now dominate car
sales in Brazil (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Vehicle sales in Brazil
Source: Mario Roberto Duran Ortiz / ANFAVEA, 2008
The success of Brazil's ethanol industry cannot be attributed to tech-
nology alone, however. In fact, to accomplish the replacement of the
dominant technology for motor vehicle fueling on a massive, commer-
cially viable scale, other elements of the "ecosystem" had to be in place: a
wide distribution network to make ethanol reasonably available to most
or all Brazilian drivers and an ethanol production complex capable of
keeping up with demand at a reasonable cost. One of the remarkable
features about the use of biofuel in Brazil is the widespread availability of
ethanol in gas stations throughout Brazil; more than 35,000 stations in
total (Projeto Agora, 2011). Without this distribution network (conspicu-
ously absent, for instance, for ethanol in the United States), flex-fuel ve-
hicles would be less attractive to Brazilians. But the most extraordinary
aspect of the development of the ethanol sector in Brazil is the transfor-
mation of the sugarcane/ethanol production complex, which has made the
Brazilian sugarcane industry the most advanced in the world. To begin
with, most Brazilian sugarcane is no longer grown in the Northeast, but
5892012]
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around Brazil's industrial heartland, the state of Sio Paulo, and, to a
much lesser extent, the neighboring states of Parand and Mato Grosso do
Sul, which account for 85 percent of sugarcane growing in the country
(see Figure 3). Sio Paulo alone contains more than 60 percent of all land
under sugarcane cultivation. About one-half of the sugar crop is devoted
to ethanol production, via 230 combined milling and distilling plants, plus




Figure 3. Areas of sugarcane cultivation in Brazil
Source: Goldemberg, J. 2008.
In addition, the Brazilian sugarcane industry makes intensive use of
technology to lower production costs and increase ethanol production
without concomitant increases in area under cultivation, which presently
covers 2 to 3 percent of Brazil's arable land. Through improvements in
cultivation practices, plant varieties, and irrigation, the industry can har-
vest two crops of sugarcane every year. Every element of the plant is
given a productive use: the leaves and roots are left on the ground as
fertilizer; the bagasse is burnt to generate electricity to move the mill's
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machinery and distill the sugarcane juice into ethanol, and any excess
electricity production is sold to other electricity users. Another residue
from the juice extraction process, called vinasse, is also reused as fertil-
izer. Increasingly, the fibrous elements of the sugarcane can be used to
produce paper and certain types of plastics instead of being burnt. The
combination of these technological and agricultural advances makes Bra-
zilian sugar and ethanol highly competitive internationally, with Brazil's
sugarcane production constituting about 30 percent of world production,
and 20 percent of its ethanol production being exported (see Figure 4).
20
Figure 4. International Sugar Production Costs, ca.2009
Source: Sylvia Larrea, Inter-American Development Bank
III. THE TREASURE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE OCEAN
The most recent and most surprising of Brazil's energy transformations
is the shift from massive oil importer to massive oil producer, and even
exporter. The transformation is both recent and surprising because it
only took place with the discovery of the huge offshore "pre-salt" oil de-
posits in the last decade. The deposits were discovered through the use of
exploration and production technologies that were simply unavailable fif-
teen or twenty years ago. The challenges involved in accessing the oil are
indeed formidable: the largest fields lie more than 200km offshore in the
Atlantic Ocean, at total extraction depths of 2km to 7km below sea level
and another 5km beneath the ocean floor. To put this in context, the
infamous Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, operating at what was for
a long time the technological frontier in offshore drilling, was pumping oil
at a total depth of slightly more than 5km, with a water depth of 1.5km.
Even more surprising, the development and mastery of the technology
needed to operate at these extraordinary conditions did not belong to one
2012] 591
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of the major oil companies, but to Petrobris, Brazil's state-owned oil
company (and near-monopoly within Brazil). The breakthrough is a
story of patient and lengthy investment that made Petrobris the world
leader in offshore oil extraction, in a sector and a country that have been
characterized by enormous corruption and rent-seeking. Indeed, it is im-
possible to find a comparable example in the world, with the possible
exception of Norway's Statoil. Even PDVSA, the Venezuelan equivalent
of Petrobris long known for its technical excellence, was swiftly con-
sumed by the policies and conflicts coming out of Hugo Chivez's rise to
power, and is now a shadow of its former self. The ability of successive
Brazilian governments to keep Petrobris under professional management
criteria paid off with the discovery of the world's largest oil deposits of
the last two decades.
But there is more to this transformation. Just as the Prodlcool initiative
eventually led to the formation of a world-class sugarcane/ethanol com-
plex, the Brazilian government does not want Brazil to be simply an oil
producer, but is determined to make this an opportunity to build an en-
tire oil cluster that can not only pump oil, but produce all the equipment
needed to make the oil flow: giant oil platforms, sophisticated ducts and
valves that can withstand the critical operating conditions in the pre-salt
fields, and even the highly sophisticated electronics and data manage-
ment required for the control of the equipment under these conditions. If
successful, this policy stands to transform entire industries in Brazil, from
shipbuilding to software. Major multinational companies have already
taken note and, as happened during the "Brazilian miracle" of the 1970s
in steel, chemicals, cars, and other sectors, are already setting up shop in
Brazil. General Electric, for instance, is building its fifth global R&D
center in Rio de Janeiro in order to be closely involved in the develop-
ment of this new energy complex.
IV. AND NOW THE BAD NEWS
A Brazilian joke tells that the non-Brazilian peoples of the Earth were
upset when they saw that God had endowed Brazil with abundant re-
sources, a wondrous nature, delightful fruits, and plenty of sun to enjoy
its thousands of miles of sandy beaches. God had a simple but consoling
answer: "Wait until you see the kind of people I put there. You won't
feel it's so unfair then."
There are indeed a lot of challenges ahead for Brazil's energy transfor-
mations to fully bear fruit, and although Brazil's politics are probably the
biggest challenge, they are not the only one. To begin with, the energy
flowing from any of the major sources discussed above will not come
cheap. Take hydroelectric energy: although most of the existing dams are
entirely or substantially amortized, and can thus generate electricity at a
very low monetary cost, the expansion of hydroelectric generation will be
much more expensive than in the past. Because the Parand and S~o
Francisco basins have been largely exploited with regard to large dams,
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new sites are available only in the Amazon basin. At the outset, this
means that they will be increasingly far away from the major centers of
electricity demand, requiring large investments in the construction of
transmission lines in addition to the cost of the facilities. For example,
the Rio Madeira complex is located near the Peruvian border, requiring
the construction of a 2,500km transmission "highway" from Porto Velho
in Rond6nia State to Araraquara in Sdo Paulo-the longest transmission
line in the world (ABB, 2012) (see Figure 1).
To make matters worse, Brazil and the world have changed a lot since
the heyday of dam building under the military regime (1964-1985). Not
only is there a great deal of opposition to construction of large dams any-
where in the world, but the importance of the Amazon as the world's
largest rainforest attracts attention and pressure from all around the
globe when it comes to flooding large tracts of the forest and building
large construction sites, transmission lines, and the related roads that be-
come conduits for deforestation. In addition, the displacement of local
residents, especially indigenous peoples, is not easily accomplished in a
democratic setting. These factors are already forcing a redesign of dam
structures and construction plans in order to flood a smaller area and to
create non-permanent construction staging areas. The upshot is a higher
cost per MW of generation capacity added.
Next, consider the expansion of ethanol production. Inevitably, im-
provements in productivity will be insufficient to avoid bringing more
land under sugarcane cultivation. This will run into important con-
straints. First, because the areas north, east, and south of the current
sugar-lands are heavily populated and industrialized, expansion will have
to proceed in a westward direction, towards Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso
do Sul, and Goids. Unfortunately, the further expansion moves away
from Sio Paulo, the more limited the transport infrastructure is, raising
the cost of shipping the ethanol from production sites to the centers of
consumption and export markets. Brazil's railroad network, for instance,
barely reaches Campo Grande, the capital of Mato Grosso do Sul (see
Figure 5).
For example, in 2008, shipping one metric ton of soy produced in Lucas
do Rio Verde (Mato Grosso) to Shanghai cost $202 on average, while
shipping a ton from Iowa cost $77 (Hecht & Mann, 2008). In addition,
although the sugar-lands are far away from the Amazon rainforests and
the Pantanal wetlands (see Figure 3), the claim by the sugar growers' as-
sociation, Unica, that expansion of production would have no impact on
either area is simply disingenuous. Unica's claim ignores the fact that
even if expansion does not directly affect either area, it is quite certain to
have an indirect effect. As more land is turned into more valuable crops
in South-Central Brazil, less valuable uses-particularly cattle ranching-
will migrate northward and westward, further eating into the margins of
the rainforest and the wetlands. In fact, this migration of ranching is al-
ready happening as the agricultural frontier has progressively conquered
2012] 593
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Figure 5. Brazil's Railroad Network, 2007
Source: http://www.brazilmapxl.com/rail-map.html
the vast savannahs of the cerrado that extend from the limits of the Ama-
zon rainforest to the pampas and deserts of Southern Brazil, Paraguay,
and Argentina. Additionally, there is growing concern about the destruc-
tion of the cerrado itself-an area that, while much less biodiverse and
less populated by indigenous peoples than the Amazon, is nonetheless a
valuable biome in itself.
The most expensive challenge is the "pre-salt" oil. Lying several kilo-
meters offshore in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, and at hitherto un-
tapped depths, fully exploiting it will require an enormous investment;
and by requiring local production of much of the equipment to be used,
the Brazilian government is certain to increase the cost even further, re-
gardless of other advantages that it may bring to Brazil. The Macondo
well disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 should serve as a warning
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about the risk of controlling oil spills at the depths of the pre-salt fields;
especially when considering that any coastal oil contamination would hit
Brazil's main tourist beaches in Rio de Janeiro and Sio Paulo. Just how
much uncertainty surrounds the exploitation of the pre-salt fields was un-
derlined in June 2012, when Petrobrds and the main private Brazilian oil
exploration company, OGX, announced significant cuts in their estimates
of pre-salt oil production.
There is still one more challenge to Brazil's energy transformation, pos-
sibly the biggest one. Can the Brazilian state keep all these plates spin-
ning? Of particular concern is the willingness of Brazilian politicians to
make good use of the oil bonanza. There are good reasons to worry.
Brazil has a highly fragmented parliament, where European-style parties
pursuing coherent ideological programs contend with many other ones,
topped by the Partido do Movimento Democritico Brasileiro (PMDB).
These parties are pure patronage machines, bargaining their parliamen-
tary votes for targeted benefits for their members and narrow constituen-
cies. The entrepreneurial attitude of these politicians encourages them to
change parties as soon as they spot a better opportunity for rent-seeking.
The result is a high level of grand corruption and a state that often works
as a predatory patronage mechanism, absorbing close to one-half of Bra-
zilian GDP in exchange for fairly poor services. In 2011, Brazil ranked 73
out of 177 countries (from least to most corrupt) in the well-known Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (Transparency
International, 2012). In this fraudulent context, Brazilian politicians are
already scrambling for a piece of the oil pie. In fact, Petrobris may have
been left alone up to this point simply because Brazil did not have large
oil reserves and rents to seek until the recent discoveries, in contrast to
the well-known reserves in Mexico or Venezuela, for instance. As an ex-
ample of the feeding frenzy in the Brazilian parliament, a fierce conflict
has been going on for several years about the allocation of oil-related tax
revenues. Current Brazilian law allocates most of these revenues to the
states where the oil is produced as compensation for the actual and po-
tential environmental damage. But politicians from non-oil producing
states want a piece of the pie and have introduced legislative proposals to
modify the current allocation formula. This conflict only exacerbates the
already problematic division between north and south Brazil: Brazil's
economy and programmatic parties have their center of gravity in the
southern half, while the northern half, home to the greatest poverty and
clientelism, is overrepresented in parliament.
In sum, if Brazil is to fully realize the potential created by its three
energy transformations, it needs to accomplish a number of things. First,
it needs to find a consensus about its additional sources of electricity-
whether this electricity comes from a fuller exploitation of the Amazon
basin or from other sources, such as natural gas-fueled cogeneration,
wind and solar, biofuels, nuclear, or even oil and (imported) coal. This is
not an easy task. Every alternative has significant environmental impacts
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or risks, with the possible exception of wind and solar-and it is difficult
to envisage wind and solar attaining the scale needed to meet Brazil's
future needs (more on this below).
Second, Brazil needs to increase its investment in the infrastructure
needed to make these transformations possible, especially in the trans-
port infrastructure needed to connect the agricultural lands of the central
part of the country with the major urban centers and export facilities on
the eastern seaboard. Like other Latin American countries, Brazil allo-
cates too much of its tax revenue to consumption expenditure-salaries,
pensions, and consumables-and too little to investment.
Third, Brazil needs to develop a new energy cluster that is internation-
ally competitive and not an over-protected monopoly. The latter would
increase the cost of exploiting the pre-salt fields, drain resources that
could otherwise be employed more efficiently in other sectors, and add
another drag to the rest of the Brazilian economy. Importantly, as we are
already seeing, creating this cluster is not only about building factories
and physical facilities, but also improving the educational system to pro-
duce the workforce and managers required to operate such facilities
efficiently.
The key to these accomplishments will be keeping the sharks at bay.
The most destructive sharks are the old-school politicians, who will do
their utmost to siphon funds to line their own pockets and "splash" their
supporters with some largesse. Pure rent-seeking of this kind will take
resources away and allocate it to uses of very little economic value. Lum-
bering more than predatorial, technocrats and high-level bureaucrats in
the public sector will seek to control the greatest amount of resources in
order to maintain or enhance their power and support their ideological
goals. The danger of such vast bureaucratic control is that these officials
and technocrats do not have a monopoly on the efficient implementation
and operation of major investment projects. While they can point with
pride to accomplishments like Itaipii, there are also significant failures,
like the management of Brazil's airports. Lastly, we should not forget
that many private-sector managers, both domestic and foreign, would be
delighted to consolidate or obtain monopolistic positions that would en-
sure them a comfortable life. All too often, the desire to build national
champions and new clusters in Brazil has resulted in the creation of pro-
tected, market-dominant positions for privileged companies at the ex-
pense of Brazilian consumers and other sectors of the economy, as the
banking and electronics industries show.
V. DON'T DESPAIR (YET)
The recent history of Brazil shows that moving forward is far from im-
possible. Before we take an excessively negative view of the future, we
need to consider the favorable elements of the situation. The most im-
portant element is the fact that the massive investment effort needed to
expand Brazil's energy sources can only be accomplished in partnership
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with the private sector, including foreign companies. Despite the huge
size and capacity of the Brazilian state, it lacks the technology, organiza-
tional capacity, and capital to simultaneously accomplish all that is
needed. This will limit the temptation of the senior civil servants to try to
maintain exclusive control. An instructive recent example is the invest-
ments in transport infrastructure related to the celebration of the FIFA
World Cup in Brazil in 2014. The inability of the government-owned air-
port operator, Infraero, to make essential improvements in Brazil's air-
ports in time for the Cup compelled the current government-a strong
proponent of public-sector leadership in the economy-to bring in the
private sector in order to avoid major embarrassments two years from
now.
While private-sector involvement alone is no guarantee against corrup-
tion (and can often make things worse), the opportunity to create com-
petitive processes for the award of contracts to the private sector can act
as an instrument to limit corruption, because contending companies have
an interest in monitoring the award process. Moreover, the participation
of multinational companies can promote the absence of corruption to the
extent that these companies have a global reputation to protect. The key
will be to award contracts on a transparent, competitive basis open to
foreign as well as domestic bidders. Fortunately, President Dilma has
shown a determined will to stamp corruption out, and has already sacked
several of her ministers in connection with corruption allegations.
But perhaps it is time to think about a new energy transformation for
Brazil; one that is less dependent on large infrastructure investments and
the rent-seeking that has sometimes come with past transformations. As
the country debates how to meet its future energy needs without further
damaging its unique ecosystems, it might be worth considering that large
hydro (and nuclear) facilities are yesterday's solutions, not tomorrow's.
Thanks to the widespread construction of large dams across the world in
the second half of the 20th century, there is increasingly strong evidence
about the negative impacts of large dams: displaced peoples who seldom
obtain the compensation that they were promised; massive, if temporary,
carbon emissions from the vegetation that is flooded by the reservoir;
permanent changes in local climate due to the creation of large bodies of
water; and massive alteration of riverine ecosystems. In Brazil's case, to
this list we need to add the impact of the construction of transmission
lines across thousands of miles of rainforest.
What are the alternatives to building more large dams, expanding culti-
vated areas, or extracting more hydrocarbons? Brazil has vast potential
for solar, wind, and small hydro generation of electricity. Many parts of
Brazil have a large proportion of sunny days, because the rains tend to be
concentrated in a relatively short season. The vast, east-facing coastline
and the orography of the escarpment that separates much of the coast
from the inland plateau result in excellent wind conditions throughout a
good portion of Brazil's eastern seaboard (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Brazil Wind Map
Source: http://www.electronica-pt.com/index.php/content/view/199/37/
The deployment of smart-grid technology, together with the steep drop
in the cost of solar panels in recent years, creates the opportunity to de-
ploy solar panels throughout the country, and especially in Brazil's com-
pact cities, where the energy generated by these panels during the
daytime-when people are at work-can be aggregated and directed to-
wards other users. Another major opportunity lies in solar water heating.
A Brazilian quirk from the days of cheap hydroelectricity is the wide-
spread use of the chuveiro, an electric water heater installed at the
showerhead. The chuveiro increases the risk of electrocution-it is said
to have been one of the secrets behind the success of havaianas sandals,
because their rubber prevents ground contact when taking a shower-
and, because the chuveiro relies on simple resistance heating, it is tremen-
dously inefficient. In fact, the use of the chuveiro in the mornings and
early evenings is a major contributor to peak electricity demand in Brazil
during the daily cycle, and accounts for one-fourth of household use of
electricity in Brazil (Aradjo & Belchior, 2011). Chuveiros could be easily
replaced by low-cost solar water heating kits that require no external en-
ergy input, only enough water pressure to fill the tank associated with the
kit. In fact, replacement is not even necessary-existing chuveiros can
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just be left in place and turned on during rainy days. A Brazilian design
for a low-cost solar water heating kit, called ABSC (Aquecedor Solar de
Baixo Custo, or Low-Cost Solar Water Heater), is available in the public
domain and could be industrially produced at a low cost, because it in-
volves little more than a few plastic parts.
VI. A MODEST PROPOSAL: FOCUS ON THE POOR
A new energy transformation that pays particular attention to offering
affordable energy to the poor would help meet Brazil's social needs in
addition to helping address its dilemma of energy and environmental sus-
tainability. Although poverty is still extensive in Brazil, the poor account
for a relatively small proportion of energy consumption, simply because
they cannot afford it. But, with the rapid incorporation of large segments
of the poor into the working and middle classes, thanks to the favorable
economic conditions and the expansion of social programs, a good part of
the growth in demand for energy in Brazil will surely come from this
economically rising part of the population. As the new working class
purchases cars and appliances, their energy needs will grow significantly.
It is here that a fourth transformation could make a difference by helping
meet these needs at a lower economic and environmental cost.
Many of the elements to make this happen are already available.
Rooftop solar panels and solar water heaters will work particularly well,
for instance, in many favelas (informal settlements) precisely because
they are often located on steep hillsides where formal housing was not
allowed. Building on such sites has many disadvantages, but one sure
advantage is a much greater exposure to the sun and thus increased po-
tential for the use of solar technologies. By selling electricity during the
day, when the price of electricity is at its highest, and buying electricity
after dark, when its price is dropping, favela households will be able to
lower their electricity bills, while solar water heaters will save them up to
25 percent of their electricity consumption.
Opportunities are not confined to exploiting alternative sources of en-
ergy, but should include opportunities to save or make more efficient use
of energy as well. Here also, the low-hanging fruit may be found in the
favelas. Poor construction techniques, materials, and knowledge result in
self-built housing that requires a lot of cooling at the end of the day, a
situation only exacerbated in hillside locations. A simple, low-cost solu-
tion already successfully implemented in South Africa, is the deployment
of cellulosic roof insulation-which can be easily made from recycled pa-
per, for instance-that drastically decreases the heating of interior spaces
covered by tin roofs. Several companies in Brazil, such as COELBA in
Bahia, AES Eletropaulo in Sdo Paulo, and Light in Rio, are already ex-
panding programs to replace old refrigerators and dangerous, inefficient
electrical circuits inside the houses of low-income families (Mirquez and
Ruffn, 2011). These programs could easily be expanded or supplemented
by others offering construction advice to help improve ventilation and
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natural lighting in self-built housing, following the lead of cement giant
Cemex with their Patrimonio Hoy program in Mexico.
Brazil's tremendous accomplishments in the development of hydroe-
lectric generation, the production and use of biofuels, and offshore oil
drilling may or may not bring new successes in regard to energy. When
looking at the future of energy in Brazil, the expression "tudo acaba em
samba" (it all ends with a samba) comes to mind. Anyone who has been
to a samba school rehearsal will understand this expression without diffi-
culty: confusion, even chaos; nothing starts when it is supposed to, and
ends much later than scheduled; it's crowded and unbearably hot, and
very noisy. And yet, "tudo acaba em samba" is not an expression of de-
spair, but of joy; because amid all the craziness, the music emerges and
everyone is happy while they dance and sing to the samba. Brazil's en-
ergy industry is certain to experience important setbacks as well as ad-
vances over the next decade. Brazil is not a country for those who abhor
strong emotions. But the past record and the present striving augur well
for the future. Don't be surprised if it turns out to be a happy one, after
all.
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